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Government to State: Globalization, Regulation,
and Governments as Legal Persons
JANET MCLEAN*
INTRODUCTION

Is the state dead, in retreat, or increasingly significant? Much of the
globalization literature disputes these questions.' Responses tend to vary
according to the discipline invoked and its preexisting assumptions about the
state. 2 A legal account of the nation-state, together with an account of how the
dominant legal conceptions are shifting, may provide fresh insights into the
phenomenon of globalization. This paper focuses on how governments have
typically been conceived as legal persons in the Anglo-American tradition and
traces how the increasing significance of international treaties and contractual
modes of governance has affected those conceptions.
There is no single version of government as a legal entity. The law
conceives of government differently depending on the subdiscipline involved.
The internally-focused public law subdisciplines of administrative and
constitutional law construct government as an entity fragmented by the
separation of powers. The externally focused international law subdiscipline
constructs government as a whole, unified in the executive. Contract law
shares this version of government as a unified legal person dominated by the
* Janet McLean, Faculty of Law, The University of Auckland, New Zealand. The research for this paper
was undertaken while I was a visiting fellow at the Law Program, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University in 2001. A version was presented at the symposium "Globalization and
Governance: The Prospects for Democracy" at the University of Indiana Law School April2002. Mythanks
to participants at that symposium for their helpful comments, and Grant Liddell for asking the question that
sparked this inquiry.
1. See SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY, at xi (1996) (declaring the United States to be an exception and notes associated and multiple
paradoxes such as the increasing desire of ethnic communities to become states); cf.UNDA WEISS, THE MYTH
OF THE POWERLESS STATE: GOVERNING IN THE GLOBAL ERA 194 (1998) (recording the "phenomenon of

state denial" and suggesting that globalists have both overstated and overgeneralised the degree of state
powerlessness).
2. As Weiss comments, some of the commentaries reflect the "tendency in social science to ignore or
conceptually de-emphasize the state's importance in structuring social relations." WEISS, supra note 1, at 3.
She suggests "neo-liberal economic philosophy" has contributed to this tendency. Id. at 193. Few would
contend that "command and control" was ever an accurate description of how regulation worked as a social
phenomenon. Legal forms of analysis almost always impose an artificial and abstracted account of social
relations upon the variety of social relations.
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executive. How the government actor is constructed will depend on which
legal form of regulation is chosen. As international and contractual versions of
government come to dominate, a number of consequences follow. These may
even include challenges to the norms which have traditionally operated under
constitutional and administrative law frameworks.
This legal account of the state suggests conflicting and paradoxical
tendencies. Rather than observing a state that is simply shrinking, we observe
the increasing ability of the executive to make binding commitments on behalf
of the state; the increasing juridification of such commitments; the relocation of
politics and high politics not only to international bodies but also to courts; and
a diminution in the ability of governments to respond to local pressures-a
diminution in the zone of "public politics," if you will. Governments assert
power with the effect of diminishing the ability of future governments to
exercise power. Increasingly, there is a trend towards treating nation-states as
"states" rather than as merely "governments."
While this paper attempts to generalize about the Anglo-American legal
position, it is motivated by the New Zealand experience over the last 18 years.
In many ways, that experience may suggest these trends rather more strongly
than other western common law systems.3 New Zealand is a small unitary
democracy, with a unicameral Parliament and Westminster system of
government. It has embraced neo-liberal economic policy in a more "pure"
form than most countries and has actively eschewed "public regulation" for
"regulation by private law" (particularly by the law of contract). This has been
combined with New Zealand's strong self-perception as a "good international
citizen." In 1999, when a coalition government was elected which did not
openly espouse neo-liberal policies, it became a real question for the first time
in over a decade whether the reforms could be undone and how much they had
become embedded both legally and politically.
I. GOVERNMENTS AS LEGAL ENTITIES UNDER THE COMMON LAW
The starting observation is that different areas of the common law tend to
conceive differently of the government or state as a legal entity. That is one
very important reason why the choice of regulatory instrument matters. There
are two instruments of choice in this era of globalization: international
3. While England has been closest to New Zealand legally and constitutionally, Britain's membership in
the European Union has profoundly affected its position.
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agreements, and contracts for regulation and policy delivery. The way in which
"government" is conceived in international and contract law is quite distinct
from the way in which "government" has traditionally been conceived in
administrative and constitutional law in the common law tradition.
International and contract law both tend to conceive of the government
actor as a determinate legal person: a single authority representing all branches
of the state and able to make commitments on behalf of the whole. When we
imagine the government legal actor in its treaty-making and contractual
capacities, we tend to unify the different branches of government in the
executive. Crucially, the question of how the executive can bind the other
branches is commonly obscured, or subsumed, by traditional notions of the
prerogative or by a generous view of contractual capacity. Consequently, the
role for public politics is diminished. The political supervision of technocrats
by legislatures is reduced, and formerly public processes become private. At
the enforcement level, where contract law is concerned, judges are no longer as
willing to defer to political actors and high policy as they would be under
administrative law methodology. 4 At the same time, international law norms
and agreements are becoming increasingly enforceable.
Contract and international law tend in one other important respect to
conceive of a unified government legal personality. This determinate artificial
legal person who enters international agreements and contracts tends to be
viewed as consistent over time, whatever the changes to its membership and
ideology. As such, the legal person of the state has a greater capacity to make
binding commitments into the future than we would traditionally have
contemplated in administrative law and, absent special constitutional
procedures, in constitutional law.
Administrative law does not contain a juristic conception of the state. As
traditionally conceived, administrative law contains few notions of the "state" at
all, let alone as a unified whole. Rather, its central preoccupation is with
political rivalries between different parts of the state. It is concerned with
regulating the relative powers of tribunals, Ministers, officials, agencies, and
courts. Administrative law decisions and scholarship evidence a self-conscious
need to justify and legitimate judicial interference with political actors. While
4. Non-justiciable issues and issues of high policy tend to shift to international forums. Immigration
and extradition matters, especially those raising security concerns, may be an important exception to this
trend. The British cases are discussed by Sir David Williams in his paper in this volume. Sir David
Williams, Globalization and Governance: The Prospectsfor Democracy, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 157 (2002).
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contemporary academic controversies tend to focus on what should be the
proper justifications for judicial intervention, there is a shared sense of the
fundamental importance of articulating such justifications.5
Administrative law has sought to achieve a (sometimes delicate) balance
between protecting the public from the arbitrary and capricious actions of
governments and maintaining a distinct place for politics into which courts
should not enter. The "no fettering" rules and limited availability of estoppel
demonstrate a concern to preserve the ability of governments to change their
minds. In its traditional form, at least, administrative law can be viewed as a
product of the anti-statist Anglo-American tradition. There is no "state"-only
a very different and temporally contingent creature, "the Government of the
day," or, more commonly in the Westminster system, "the Minister responsible
for the time being."6
There is little of the "state" to be found in the constitutional law of the
Westminster tradition either. The Westminster tradition regards the Queen in
Parliament as the central repository of legal sovereignty. That is quite different
from treating Parliament as synonymous with the state, or Parliament as a
juristic person. Constitutional law, of course, varies greatly among common
law jurisdictions according to their federal or other arrangements and particular
instantiations of the separation of powers. 7 Nevertheless, two important
characteristics could be said to be shared by jurisdictions founded in that
tradition. First, there is no state, as such, but rather legislative, executive, and
judicial branches that compete with each other for power and check each
other's excesses to varying degrees.8 Second, subject to any constitutional
limits, each legislature has full (if not exclusive) law-making power-a
5. See, e.g., Paul Craig & Nicholas Bamforth, ConstitutionalAnalysis, ConstitutionalPrinciple and
JudicialReview, 2001 Pub. L. 763 (review article) (discussing the contemporary British controversy about
the basis of judicial review); see also MARK ELLIOTT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 1-19 (2001).
6. Freedland has remarked in the British context that administrative law is less likely than constitutional
law, for example, to think of the government as a unified corporate entity represented by the Crown. Rather,
administrative law is more likely to conceive of the state in terms of separate departments functioning as
separate entities in the name of the respective Minister. Mark Freedland, The Crown and the Changing
Nature of Government, in THE NATURE OF THE CROWN: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 114-15

(Maurice Sunkin & Sebastian Payne eds., 1999). I would go further than he and add international and
contract law as points of much greater comparison.
7. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000)
(discussing the separation of powers in comparative perspective). As will become clear, a functional
separation of powers can take place within the executive branch.
8. For the view that the separation of powers is more about efficiency than competition, see N.W. Barber,
Prelude to the Separation of Powers, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 59 (2001).
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legislature cannot, without special constitutional agreement, limit the actions of
future legislatures. Legislatures too exercise temporally contingent powers.
In common law terms, there is no separate artificial person representing the
state for constitutional purposes. The closest approximation to the state in
English constitutional law is the Crown. The personality of the natural person
King or Queen tended to be fused with the King or Queen's public or
constitutional role. The traditional view, as expressed by Sir John Salmond last
century, was that the "real personality of the monarch, who is the head of state,
has rendered superfluous ... any attribution of legal personality to the state
itself." 9 Controversies about legal personality in constitutional law have tended
to revolve around whether the King's ancient immunities applied to the acts of
his Ministers and officials.10 Traditionally, the closer the actions came to being
those of the sovereign, the less likely a suit could be brought (unless consent
had been given). " Attempts to define the "identity" of the sovereign were for
the very purpose of avoiding the ordinary consequences of having juristic
personality. Sovereign immunity rendered the personality of the state "nonjuristic"--not subject to legal processes. The sovereign itself could only waive
immunity as an exercise of its grace and favor (in England by means of the
petition of right). In the Westminster tradition, the sovereign Crown has tended
to be treated as synonymous with the executive even as sovereignty has been
regarded as residing in the Queen in Parliament.

9. P.J. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 321 (12th ed. 1966). He goes on to say: "Most
public property is the property of the King ...public liabilities are those of the King; it is he, and he alone,
who owes the principal and interest of the national debt." Id. at 321-22.
10. The precise contours of these immunities have been in dispute. Bracton suggested that the King is
subject to God and the law "for the law makes the King" but that the King (like any other feudal lord) could
not be sued in his own courts. The only redress was to petition the King-redress being a matter of grace and
favour. See John F. Reinhardt, The Status of the Crown in the Time of Bracton, 17 TEMP. U.L.Q. 242, 257
(1943). It is one thing to impute a bad motive to the King for the tortious acts of his servants and quite
another to hold an official himself or herself responsible.
11.Perhaps surprisingly, the English common law idea that the "King can do no wrong" was translated in
the United States into a relatively strong federal doctrine of sovereign immunity. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. &
WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 340 (2nd ed. 2001). The authors question the incorporation of
the British doctrines at the federal level. The doctrine is scarcely compatible with Republican government
under the United States Constitution. Id. State immunity was granted to the states by the eleventh
amendment. References to the United States as a juristic person in this context share certain ambiguous
features with similar references to the Crown. Most commonly the Crown or United States is used as a
synonym for the executive branch of government. However, in rare cases the terms embrace a broader notion
of Government as a whole. In the United States this tends to be defined by statute. The Tucker Act 1887, for
example, waives sovereign immunity for claims founded "upon the Constitution ...
or any Act of Congress or
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States."
Tucker Act 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1887).
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Most of the sovereign's immunities from ordinary suit have now been
removed by statute. 12 The removal of immunities in both contract and
international law settings is one important factor that brings us to the very
problems that are the subject of this paper.13 Sovereign personality, which was
historically defined for negative purposes, has lately come to be used to define
the positive state actor.
Broadly speaking, in the common law tradition, constitutional and
administrative law tend to conceive of governments in terms of their rival
component parts rather than as a unified juristic entity embracing all of these
parts. These conceptions also reflect, sometimes in quite pronounced ways, a
temporally contingent account of government power. The increasing
significance of international treaty law and of contractual modes of governance
puts pressure on these domestic public law conceptions. This process of
transforming the "Government of the Day" into the "state" in the globalization
context is a trend that deserves further attention.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Public law, in the Anglo-American tradition, configures the government
differently depending on whether it is acting domestically or externally.
International law has always regarded the state as a unified legal person with
the capacity to bind itself into the future. Even as Maitland lamented the
absence of a "state" tradition so far as British domestic law was concerned, he
acknowledged that at least in its international relationships, Great Britain was a
state entity-a juristic person, with the ability to borrow money, enter
agreements, and the like. 14 In the international sphere, at least, the state has
always enjoyed a legal personality distinct from the constituted governmental
order.
This difference in how the state is conceived internationally from
domestically did not matter much so long as the legal spheres remained distinct.
However, the differences between the external version of the government as
12. A statutory waiver of immunity itself signals some of the ambiguities that surround the identity of the
sovereign in the Anglo-American context. In the Westminster system Parliament came to be considered

"sovereign."
13. 1 have deliberately left tort law out of this analysis on the basis that I believe that obligations voluntarily

undertaken pursuant to contract and international treaty law raise concerns that are quite distinct from those
obligations imposed on parties by the law.
14. Frederic William Maitland II, The Crown as Corporation, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC
WILLIAM MAITLAND III 104-40, 113-15 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1983).
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legal person and the domestic one have become much more important as the
substance of international agreements has changed, as courts have become more
involved in supervising their implementation, and as the variety and capacity of
enforcement mechanisms has increased. International agreements tended
traditionally to be about matters between states-involving war powers,
territorial disputes, and the like. However, international agreements no longer
purport to deal with matters just between states-they increasingly concern
relationships between states and individuals and companies, and relationships
between individuals. Trade, finance, environmental, and human rights
agreements increasingly impact "behind the border" in areas that were formerly
the province of national legislatures.15
Of course, the differences between international agreements then and now
can be overstated. State-to-state "territorial matters" undoubtedly affect the
lives of people in countries at war and indigenous peoples subject to
colonization in the most direct way possible. Access to trading blocs, to natural
resources and to capital were common reasons for empire. The distinctions are
more subtle than is often presented. The colonial era, however, at least held out
a promise of eventual national self-determination.
On their own terms, prior to the Second World War, treaties purported to
regulate only state-to-state relationships. The explicit scope of such agreements
has expanded without any change in what international law requires for a state
to make a binding commitment. Any commitment entered into by international
agreement is not merely the commitment of the government of the day, but a
commitment of the state itself. Additionally, many of these treaties do not
contain a process by which states can withdraw, or they hold states bound in a
6
web of agreements.1
Notwithstanding the broadened scope of such agreements, international law
has not changed in its approach to questions of implementation. As a matter of
international law, national law is no excuse for the non-performance of treaty
and other commitments.' 7 Municipal law cannot be pleaded as a valid
justification for an international illegal act. This strong tendency for

15. I am not suggesting that the various international agreements enjoy the same level of impact, or that the
compliance mechanisms are of equal force.
16. See K.J. Keith, Sovereignty: A Legal Perspective, in STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY: IS THE STATE IN
RETREAT? 83, 97-98 (G. Wood & L. Leland, Jr. eds., 1997).

17. This is subject to the exceptions in Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treatfra.htm; see also J.H.H.
WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 166 (1999).
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international law and practice to favor a world order of unitary states has other
consequences as treaties gain more direct effect. Federal states enjoy plenary
external treaty-making capacity and internal treaty-making power under
international law. They also tend to enjoy internal implementing competence,
even when this may intrude upon the powers allocated exclusively to member
states under the terms of confederation.' 8
When treaties typically involved matters strictly between states, the primary
methods of enforcement were international diplomacy and international dispute
mechanisms-and enforcement was at the instigation of the political actors.
For the most part, domestic law could ignore such agreements-leaving them in
the non-justiciable province of prerogative power. Increasingly, though,
treaties have begun to regulate relationships between states and individuals and
among individuals, and courts have been required to consider these treaty
obligations. In terms of available enforcement mechanisms, international law
itself has changed; this is the era of enforceability in international law.
International agreements increasingly do not depend on states for their
enforcement but may be enforced by individuals and companies, both in
international dispute tribunals and in national courts. In this latter respect, the
European Community has forged a new international law model. In Costa v.
Enel, 19 the European Court recognized that some provisions of the Treaty of
Rome had a direct effect on the legal relations between member states and their
nationals. Individuals could require national courts to protect rights given them
by Treaty. In some cases, Treaty provisions have been held to give individuals
rights against a private party (horizontal direct effect) and not just against the
state itself.20 Under European Community law, an E.U. directive is binding on
all constituent parts of the member states-the executive, the legislature and the
judiciary (vertical direct effect). 2 The state is a unity. While the European
Community still represents a high watermark of integration and direct
18. For a detailed and helpful analysis of these points see J.H.H. Weiler, The ExternalLegalRelations of
Non- UnitaryActors, in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE, supra note 17, at 130-87. He suggests that Canada
may be an exception. Id. at 13844. The Australian Constitution explicitly gives the federal government the
competence to implement legislation if pursuant to external affairs. AUSTL. CONST. ch. 1, pt. V, § 51 (xxix).
In the United States, Missouri v. Holland,252 U.S. 416, 417 (1920), allowed to the federal government the
power of implementation even where such legislation touches on the competences of the states. Weiler
comments that political checks and balances and a commitment to federalism have continued to play a
significant part in practice. WEILER, supra note 17, at 146-47.
19. 1964 E.C.R. 585.
20. See, e.g., Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Airenne, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
21. See Paul Craig, Once More Into the Breach: The Community, the State, and DamagesLiability, 113
L.Q. Rev. 67 (1997); Case C-188/89, Foster v. British Gas plc 1 E.C.R 3313 (1990).
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enforceability, it serves as a model for trade agreements and is perhaps a marker
of things to come.
Of course, international law does not have anything to say about how an
international obligation must be translated into domestic law in terms of
whether it must be incorporated into domestic legislation, whether it is selfexecuting, or whether it is automatically a part of the domestic law of the
jurisdiction enjoying an equal status with legislation. Domestic courts,
legislatures, and public politics still have a role to play in this area.2 2 The
interests served by treaties will vary according to the countries involved. Nor
does international law identify which bodies should deliver on treaty or other
obligations. While the state enters the primary commitments, in practice, a
23
variety of bodies, including private organizations, carry them out.
Nor does international law have anything directly to say about attempts by
legislatures to restrain the executive's treaty-making powers. As is well known,
the United States Constitution requires the consent of Senate before the
President may enter a Treaty. 24 Famously, too, congressional-executive
agreements, such as NAFTA and the WTO (indistinguishable from treaties in
terms of their abilities to bind the United States to international obligations),
have been entered into by statute, thereby avoiding the special process
prescribed by the Constitution.25 In New Zealand, the traditional view has been
that treaties do not become part of domestic law until incorporated. The
increasing significance and direct effect of treaties 26 has lead to greater

22. As Paul Craig suggested at the symposium, multilateralism allows more by way of public participation

than bilateralism, which tends to repose power even more exclusively in the executive. The role ofnongovernmental organizations at international forums is discussed elsewhere in this issue. Steve Charnovitz,
The Emergence of DemocraticParticipationin Global Governance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45
(2002). Of course, the ability of domestic politics to influence the content of treaties themselves will depend
on the power of the country or power bloc concerned.
23. See, e.g., the Draft Articles on Responsibility of the State for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001,
adopted by the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Session, Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001). The Draft Articles provide that acts of state may include "the conduct of a person or entity which is
not an organ of the State ... but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the
governmental authority," acts performed "in the absence or default of the official authorities," and conduct
that a state acknowledged or adopted as its own. Id., arts. V, IX, XI.
24. The President "shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the senators present concur." Id., art. lI, cl. 2.
25. See generally John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties? The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive
Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001).
26. See, for example, the courts' efforts to give effect to treaties as mandatory relevant factors in the
exercise of administrative discretion in the immigration cases of Tavita v. MinisterofImmigration [1994] 2
N.Z.L.R. 257, and Puli'uvea v. Removal Review Auth., 14 F.R.N.Z. 322 (1996). For examples in the
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parliamentary supervision and input into the treaty-making process.27
Notwithstanding the attempts to increase the legitimacy of these processes,
neither of the two major political parties has ever conceded, nor come close to
conceding, that legally the executive's plenary power and capacity to enter
treaties is in any way diminished. At least for established democracies,
however, there is the potential for political checks and balances around these
processes.
International law's stance on the external capacities of states to bind nations
internally has potentially more serious consequences for developing nations that
enter into trading and other agreements before they have established democratic
structures. Because there is no necessary connection between statehood and
democracy, the dominance of the international agreement as a regulatory
instrument achieves even greater significance for such developing countries.
There is no general endorsement of a principle of democracy in international
law. To be a state requires both that government (or tyrant) actually control the
people, and also recognition by other states. These minimal criteria fall far
short of a requirement that governments be democratically elected or even
enjoy the general support of the people. Indeed, as a matter of practice, "in the
mid-1980s only about a third of all the countries of the world could be
described as democratic, and a still smaller proportion had longstanding and
stable democratic structures. ' '28 Even in the absence of any basis for a state's
authority in terms of the will of the people, international law grants a state
sufficient juristic personality to enter commitments binding into the future.
While there is room then for individual governments to increase the
legitimacy of their international commitments, this is not a matter with which
international law has traditionally been concerned. Unitary states retain
primary capacity to make such commitments, and while domestic legal
arrangements allow varying methods of implementation of international
commitments, international law has been desirous that domestic obstacles to the
implementation of international commitments not be used to justify breaches of
state obligations. Primary responsibility for breaches of such commitments

regulatory area see Sellers v. Maritime Safety Inspector [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 44, and New ZealandAirline
Pilots'Ass'nv. Attorney-General [1997] 3 N.Z.L.R. 269.
27. See generally, Treasa Dunworth, Public InternationalLaw, 2000 N.Z.L. REV. 217, Treasa Dunworth,
PublicInternationalLaw, 2002 N.Z.L. REV. 255; Mai Chen, A ConstitutionalRevolution? The Role of the
New Zealand Parliamentin Treaty-Making, 19 N.Z.U. L. REV. 448 (2001).
28. James Crawford, Democracy and the Body of InternationalLaw, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 91,95 (G.H. Fox & B.R. Roth eds., 2000).
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remains with the unitary state. Lastly, the ways in which such commitments
can be enforced are changing to allow individuals a private Attorney-General
type role.
Within public law, the government as legal actor is conceived differently
depending on whether it is acting "externally" or "internally." In its external
manifestation it takes a state-like character. The state, as juristic person, has
plenary power to make commitments on any subject matter. Its commitments
"to all the world" transcend governments and bind into the future. Such
commitments are binding on the state at international law regardless of
domestic resistance to such policies. Treaty commitments are also increasingly
enforceable by individuals in domestic courts and other tribunals. Democratic
concerns and separation of powers arguments simply do not figure as a matter
of international law.
III. CONTRACTS
A second parallel pressure consolidates and reinforces this transformation
of the "government of the day" to the "state." This pressure results from the
increasing domestic use of contracts by governments to pursue their policies
and as a means of regulation. This is the second "regulatory instrument of
choice" in the globalized environment. The increasing use by governments of
contracts introduces a second dichotomy-the government legal actor is
conceived of differently in private law compared with administrative law.
Some administrative law scholars have argued that the use of contracts as a
mechanism of regulation potentially increases the accountability of government
and contributes to more rational and efficient regulation. 29 On this view, the
use of contracts improves and builds upon core administrative law values and
methodology. After all, who would deny that it is a good thing for governments
to be transparent about their commitments and to fulfill them?
There will, of course, be cases in which these claims made for contracting
may be bome out. Other cases, however, demonstrate the important and
overlooked differences between administrative law and contract law values.
One source of difference is that contract law and administrative law tend to
conceive of the government actor differently. Choice of regulatory instrument
matters here, too. Three examples may help to illustrate this point. The first
involves the use of contract by government in an attempt to embed its
29. Jody Freeman, PrivateRole in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 549 (2000).
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controversial asset sale program past an election. The second also involves
contracts entered into during an election campaign, but in this example, the
executive has successfully disaggregated itself into separate commercial and
regulatory arms in order to obtain greater policy flexibility. The third illustrates
the potential for a so-called "regulatory contract" to impose financial and
political costs on successor legislatures and administrations, and an
unsuccessful attempt to separate the executive's regulatory and commercial
functions.
A. Embedding a Policy Program
Whether to privatize Pearson airport in Toronto became a matter of intense
political debate between the government and the opposition in the election
campaign. The Liberal leader, then in opposition, announced his party's policy
that the airport terminals should be leased to a non-profit corporation rather
than to a for-profit partnership. With eighteen days to go before the election,
the incumbent government sold the airport to a private consortium. Having
won the election, the Liberal Government (after an inquiry into the contractual
process and price 30 ) repudiated the contracts and sought to pass legislation that
would have relieved the government of the ordinary contractual measure of
damages. The legislation was blocked in the Senate.3 1 In the meantime, the
partnership successfully sued the government for full compensation in the
32
Ontario Divisional Court.
The Ontario Divisional Court,33 applying orthodox contract law principles,
treated the agreement to sell the airport as binding on Canada as a juristic
person. It was irrelevant to the resolution of the contractual issues that the
matter was one of high politics, that the government had changed, or that by
entering into the agreement during the campaign the outgoing government
effectively secured its policies for the future. Of course, the new government
could theoretically have passed legislation absolving itself from contractual
30. The successful consortium's major shareholder was founded by a prominent backer of the governing
Conservatives leading to allegations of patronage. See Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract:
Damagesfor Breach of Contract by Government, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 467, 476 (1999).
31. See generally Ronald J. Daniels & Michael J. Trebilcock, PrivateProvision ofPublicInfrastructure:
An OrganizationalAnalysis of the Next PrivatizationFrontier,46 U. TORONTO L.J. 375, 383-87 (1996).
32. TIT2 Limited Partnership v. Canada, 23 O.R.3d 81 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1995), affd 24 O.R.3d 546 (Ct.
App. 1995).

33. Id. See generallyDaniels & Trebilcock, supra note 31, at 383-87; Patrick J. Monahan, Is the Pearson
AirportLegislation Unconstitutional? The Rule ofLaw as a Limit on ContractRepudiation by Government,
33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 411 (1995).
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liability, but it failed in the attempt. The legislation was defeated partly by rule
of law arguments: government should be subject to the same law as ordinary
persons in its commercial dealings.3 4

The statement that governments should be treated the same as ordinary
persons in their commercial dealings begs the central question: Who is the
government for these purposes-what kind of legal person is Canada? It is
assuredly not an ordinary person, but rather an artificial one. While such an
argument purports to rely on a Diceyan notion of the rule of law, Dicey did not
himself conceive of the state as a unified entity. He believed that legal
sovereignty belonged to the Queen-in-Parliament, and that the Crown's powers
had been relinquished to and constrained by Parliament. He denied the
existence of the administrative state and saw only natural persons serving
official roles.35
Contract law imports into the rule of law debate its own conceptions about
the determinate characteristics of the legal persons who enter into binding
agreements.
The implicit assumptions we make about the nature of
governments as legal persons are fundamental here. Underlying the rule of law
arguments is an unexamined construction of the state as a juristic person.
Contract law assumes a unified person for its purposes. Despite the underlying
conceptual confusions, the effect of these rule of law arguments is that it will
often be much easier for legislatures to repeal legislation than to override
contracts by legislation-even when those contracts have been entered into by
the political rival of the governing party. Contract law does not recognize such
political rivalry-the government is a unified and constant person for

34. See Monahan, supranote 33.
35. According to Collini, Dicey regarded the common law judges as closest to representing "the august
dignity of the State." STEFAN COLLINI, PUBLIC MORALISTS: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE
IN BRITAIN 296 (1991) quoted in J. Stapleton, Dicey and his Legacy, 16 HIST. OF POL. THOUGHT 234, 239

(1995). Dicey suggested that: "Every official from the Prime Minister down to a constable or collector of
taxes is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen."
ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 2 (10th

ed., 1959).

The only way to reconcile the two aspects of Dicey's conception-that government is a contest rather than a
unity and government actors (determinate persons) should be subject to the ordinary law-is that when Dicey
said that officials should be subject to the ordinary law he really intended to refer to natural person officials
and he probably had the law of tort exclusively in mind. It was for this reason that Ernest Barker, who was
otherwise sympathetic to Dicey's project, rejected his theory as an incomplete solution. Barker thought that
legal notions of the state were so oblique as to escape the rule of law. Barker's answer, at least initially, was
that the state itself (rather than merely its officials) should be called into account as a "juristic person." E.
Barker, The Rule of Law, I POL. Q. 118, 121 (1914) quoted in Stapleton, supra, at 243. He later backed away
from these views. See DAVID RUNCIMAN, PLURALISM AND THE PERSONALITY OF THE STATE 216-18 (1997).
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contractual purposes. Once contractual capacity is recognized, that will often
be the end of the matter.
B. Separatingthe Executive's Regulatory and Commercial Functions
The second example, taken from New Zealand, involves similar issues but
a different result. Lumber Specialitiesv Hodgson 36 (hereinafter Timberlands)
involved a political contest during an election campaign about whether the
logging of rare timber should be permitted. The timber in this instance was
owned by the government of New Zealand and vested in one of the few
remaining unprivatized, state-owned corporations incorporated under the
Companies Act 1993. The result in this case was different from that in Pearson
only because the court treated the regulatory and commercial arms of the
government as disaggregated. It treated the government as contractor and the
government as regulator as distinct legal entities. This allowed administrative
law values to operate, and allowed the new Minister, acting in accordance with
the electoral manifesto, to change the policy of his predecessor.
Prior to the election, the then "Shareholding" Minister (as he is described in
the relevant legislation) advised the Board that the Government had approved
in principle the commencement of commercial beech harvesting. Shortly
thereafter, as part of its environmental policy, the Labour party, in opposition,
promised in its election manifesto that there would be no new contracts to log
the rare native beech. (There were some short-term trial contracts in existence
that were shortly to expire.) The manifesto also stated that, if it were to become
the government, the Labour party would not honor or pay compensation for any
contracts for supply of such timber entered into after the announcement of the
policy (10 September 1999). Timberlands notified associates potentially
affected by the Labour party's policies. Some time in September (the dates are
not clear), the state-owned enterprise entered into a number of contracts to log
its beech forests over the next eight years, beginning in seven months' time.
These contracts included force majeure clauses that absolved Timberlands from
liability if a government policy or direction prevented or restrained it from
performing its obligations.
Upon winning the election, the Labour Government immediately changed
the statement of corporate intent of the enterprise to take account of the
conservation interest and gave it a statutory direction that the harvesting of the
36. [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 347.
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Crown's beech forests was not to be undertaken. The High Court Judge upheld
the new Government's directives as lawfully made, treating them as "high
government policy-by the government of the day, and after the due exercise of
the democratic process., 37 The Judge confined himself to the question of
whether Ministers were lawfully able to change the policy under the terms of
the statute. The Minister in a regulatory role could then issue a policy direction
to the commercial arm of the executive-the state-owned timber company. It,
in turn, was then able to rely on a force majeure clause to escape its contractual
commitments. The Judge's public law finding thus allowed the corporation to
invoke the force majeure clauses and avoid contractual liability. 38 It was only
through a disaggregation of the executive into commercial and regulatory
entities that administrative law values could be applied. Much more latitude
was allowed the government as regulator than the government as contractor.
The case could well have gone the other way. This separation was taken to
exist despite the fact that, formally, the statement of corporate intent is agreed
upon between the two entities, and for other purposes (including susceptibility
to judicial review), state-owned enterprises have been considered part of the
executive branch of government. This duality was noted by Lord Woolf in New
Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General, where he remarked that
"[a]lthough, under the Act, a state enterprise is structured so that it is separate
from the Crown . . . it remains very much the Crown's creature." 39 Such
separation as was taken to exist allowed the government to take the role of
regulator-influencing matters at arms-length and on general public policy
grounds. This is a rather unexpected consequence for those who may have
thought that creating corporate entities at arms-length from central government
makes control by Ministers more difficult. In fact, such a structural separation
can increase the options for government. In this case, the perceived separation
enabled both the government and the state-owned enterprise to avoid the usual
contractual consequences of the decision.4 ° It would be a much more difficult

37. Id. at 375.

38. The new Government then promoted legislation to limit compensation to the parties to out of pocket
losses under the umbrella West Coast Accord Agreement. While the legislation was in Bill form it was
unsuccessfully challenged in the High Court. See Westco Lagan Ltd. v. Attorney-General [2001 ]1 N.Z.L.R
40, 40-1. Subsequently the legislation was passed and the government made a $120 million grant to the
affected region to account for lost jobs and economic activity.
39. New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General (1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 513, 520; see also Lumber
Specialties [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 363, 77.
40. The case of PetrocorpExplorationLtd. v. Minister ofEnergy [ 1991 ] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, further illustrates

the distinction between governments acting as regulators and as contractors. In that case the New Zealand
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thing for the government to invoke an equivalent "termination at will" clause in
its own favor than for the government to interfere with "another's" contractual
obligations on the basis of public policy. 4' A crucial factor in both of these

cases, then, is how the juristic personality of the government is conceived. The
latter case illustrates the judicial recognition not just of an institutional
separation of powers, but also of a functional separation of powers within the
executive branch.
C. Fusing the Executive's Regulatory and CommercialFunctions

U.S. v. Winstar is an even more extreme example of how important the
perceived role of the government actor can be.42 In that case, the juristic person
of the United States was disaggregated for some purposes and not for others.
An executive agency entered into a regulatory agreement with a number of
savings and loans companies. In exchange for the purchase of ailing savings
and loans, the agency offered favourable accounting treatment. Far from
resolving the crisis, this tended to exacerbate it. Six years later Congress
passed legislation restructuring the industry and prohibiting the bargained-for
accounting practice.43 The savings and loan companies then sued the U.S.
government.
The U.S. Supreme Court did not find anything in the contractual agreement
that would bind Congress to the terms of the agreement and prevent Congress
from changing the law. 44 However, the majority's findings effectively did so
government was party to a joint venture agreement for the exploration of minerals. It also regulated
prospecting and mining by the grant of licenses. The government granted a license to itself with a view to
selling it to the Joint Venture. The Court of Appeal took the view that the Minister's contractual obligations
as a party to the Joint Venture could not be overridden by the exercise of his self-licensing power for the sole
or dominant purpose of promoting the Crown's pecuniary interest. It took the view that the legislation did not
mandate the use by the Minister of his regulatory powers for essentially financial reasons to override the prior
contractual commitment. The Privy Council, by contrast, distinguished between the Minister acting as an
agent of the Crown as grantee, purchaser or seller of a license, in which role his function was analogous to that
of any other in the petroleum or mining industry, and the Minister's role as licensing and regulatory authority,
in which he had a discretion to decide what was in the public interest. Unlike the Court of Appeal, the Privy
Council did not think that this regulatory discretion was fettered in any way by the Joint Venture agreement,
and neither were there any duties to disclose to the other party or to consult with them. See generally id.
41. See Gillian Hadfield, supranote 30, at 492-93 (discussing the limitations the U.S. courts have imposed
on the application of "termination for convenience clause").
42. United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (The contract clause of the Constitution was not
implicated here, as it does not apply to the Federal Government).
43. See The Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183 (1989) (abolishing the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation).
44. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 871.
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bind Congress. The Court found that the agency had undertaken to insure
Winstar against the risk that Congress might change the law during the
amortization period, though there was no express undertaking to that effect.45
Likening the agreement to a contractual promise that it might rain tomorrow,
the Court treated the executive agency as assuming responsibility for an event
outside its control.4 6 Congress and the executive agency were disaggregated for
the purpose of construing the content of the agreement, even though it was the
U.S. government as a unified legal entity that had been sued. The different
constituent parts of the U.S. government were then re-aggregated for the
purpose of finding liability: the U.S. government as a whole was found liable
under the contract. However much the nondelegation doctrine may have
languished, under U.S. administrative law, executive agencies have never
exclusively exercised the spending power. The stakes were so high herepotential liability was estimated to be in the billions-that it is possible if not
likely that damages could be the equivalent of an exemption to the new
regulation.47
It was argued that the United States as contractor is not responsible for the
U.S. as lawgiver. The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the basis that
the characters of government as regulator and law-giver were fused in this
context. 49 The fact that there was some commercial benefit to the government,
in terms of its insurance liabilities, vanquished any other distinctions.
Moreover, the majority stated that a body's ability to limit its future authority is
itself one aspect of sovereignty: the government's capacity to make contracts
"is the essence of sovereignty itself."50 It cited U.S. v. Bekins as evidence for
this proposition. For the broader purposes of this paper it is useful to reproduce
the quotation as a whole:

45. The majority principal opinion was to the effect that the risk was assumed by the operation of law. Id.
at 868-69 (stating that the agency insured "the promisee against loss arising from the promised condition's
nonoccurrence").
46. Id.
47. Id. at 881 (The majority principal opinion asserted that the government had not demonstrated that the
award of damages would be tantamount to limiting the exercise of the government's authority). Compare id.
at 930 (Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed on the basis that "we cannot know whether the damages which
could be recovered in latter proceeding would be akin to a rebate of a tax, and therefore the equivalent of an
injunction").
48. Id. at 894. The Majority did not consider the statute law here to be of "general application"; cf.id.at
933.
49. Id. at 884. The Majority was also concerned not to create an analytically distinct separate law of
regulatory contracts.
50. Id.
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It is the essence of sovereignty to make contracts and give
consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental power.
This is constantly illustrated in the treaties and conventions in
the international field in which governments yield their
freedom of action in particular matters in order to gain the
benefits which accrue from international accord. 5'
The similarities between the construction of the government legal person in
international law and in contract law are explicitly recognized here, with a
consequent shift in the location of power to the executive. Contract law and
international law do indeed share similar conceptions of the government or state
as legal person. The principal majority opinion finds that the state can bind its
successors by contract and international law even as it concedes elsewhere in
the judgment that the legislature cannot so bind by legislation.5 2 Could it be
that the rule of recognition is changing, so that the executive can make
commitments across an expanded range of subject matter in exercise of
sovereign power and, in this way, circumvent political accountability?
Once we would have been astonished to discover that sovereignty could
reside in an executive agency in this way (an agency that had ceased to exist at
the time of the litigation). By what constitutional inversion can an executive
agency dictate to its political rival, Congress, in this kind of matter and by
operation of the law of contract? What happened to administrative law ideas
about the need for political supervision of technocrats? The use of contracts by
agencies does not improve on administrative law values here-it tends to
supplant them and invert the constitutional order. The more politically
contentious the subject matter, the more attractive such contractual means of
regulation are likely to be-and all achieved in a far more private process than

51. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 2751, 2752 (1938).
52. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 872. Compare id. at 884 n.28 ("noting that the ability to limit a body's future
authority is itself an aspect of sovereignty"). See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 145-46 (1961).
In THE CONCEPT OF LAW, Hart actually argues that there are two rival conceptions ofwhat the omnipotence of
Parliamentmay include for the purposes of determining the limits of sovereignty. The "established" sense
Hart refers to is that every single successive Parliament is omnipotent, has continuing sovereignty, and
therefore cannot prevent its successors from repealing its legislation. On the rival view, any one Parliament
would be omnipotence even to the extent of extinguishing itself. He is examining here rules of recognition in
relation to the legislature rather than the executive. Hart concludes that it is established that the legislature
cannot bind its successors. See generally id.
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administrative law would normally allow.5 3 Contracts are exempted from the
54

notice and comment procedures in the Administrative Procedure Act.
All three of these cases involved decisions that were likely to have effects
for decades to come. An airport, once privatized, is effectively sold forever, or
at least for the foreseeable future. There is no real prospect that any western
democracy has the will or capacity to renationalize assets in the short or
medium term.55 The trees involved in Timberlands took hundreds of years to
grow. The estimated period of amortization in the Winstar case was 40 years.
It will be a question of fact whether the amount required by way of contractual
damages is so large as to tie the hands of future governments. Governments are
universally constrained by the need to reduce their deficits and to maintain or
enhance their credit ratings with international agencies.
In each of these cases, controls on executive power in entering the contracts
themselves were minimal. Ultra vires tests played little or no part in these
disputes. Contractual capacity, like treaty-making capacity, was effectively
plenary in each of these cases. 5 6 Where governments are selling something,
whether assets or regulatory favors, there are remarkably few checks on the
executive, no appropriation is required,5 7 and none of the direct parties have
incentives to invoke public processes. Unlike their continental counterparts,
countries founded in the Anglo-American common law do not have
constitutionally established public processes for the sale of public assets. There
is no purposive theory of the state in the Anglo-American tradition. 8

53. See David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargainingin the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
473, 477 (1999).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1994) (exempting from the rule-making procedures as "a matter relating to
agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts").
55. The New Zealand government did have to inject a billion dollars into Air New Zealand, the formerly
government owned airline, in order to prevent the private airline's insolvency and to maintain the island
nation's strategic asset.
56 Contra Payne v. Ontario, [2002] O.A.C. 1450, available at http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/
2002/j uly/payneC38122.htm (July 7, 2002) (concluding that the power to dispose of shares in Ontario Hydro
was circumscribed by statute by implication).
57. Public procurement is also subject to little by way of legislative control. The case of New South Wales
v. Bardolph, 52 C.L.R. 455 (1934) is treated as standard commonwealth authority for the proposition that a
vote of appropriation by Parliament or prior legislative approval are not preconditions to the validity of a
contract entered into by the executive.
58. CompareCOSMO GRAHAM & TONY PROSSER, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 75-77 (1991). The'
preamble to the 1946 Constitution, incorporated into the Constitution of the Fifth Republic (France), for
example, makes privatization issues into constitutional questions. The preamble states "All property and
enterprises of which the running has, or acquires, the character of a national public service or an actual
monopoly are to become public property." Id. at 75-76. The authors comment "One can therefore begin to
see some of the practical effects of the apparent paradox that a nation with a developed concept of the state
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Contract law tends to treat "the government of the day" or rather "the
executive" as the "state," notwithstanding its rival constituent parts and the
temporally contingent nature of public policy. It conceives of a government as
a juristic person exercising a unified will over its constituent parts and over
time, and this theory was arrived at without any constitutional agreement about
the nature of the state or its purposes.
IV. PREFERRED REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The tendency to reconceive the "government of the day" as the "state" has
not been without spillover effects on administrative law itself. It is no
coincidence, given these developments, that there is pressure on legitimate
expectation doctrine to expand its limited procedural remedies to include
substantive ones. Unlike most other administrative law doctrines, legitimate
expectation doctrine requires a version of a unified legal entity of the state if it
is to have greater impact. In this, it may also reveal its continental origins.
Pressures on the doctrine come both from the increasing importance of
international human rights law and the increasing use of the regulatory contract
by government. There is not space to explore these matters fully here. Instead I
shall focus on the details of a single controversial case in order to suggest some
of these trends.
The English Court of Appeal case of R v North and East Devon Health
Authority, exparte Coughlan illustrates these pressures on administrative law. 9
The case involved the representations or promises made by officials to a
determinate class of severely disabled patients that they would be provided with
"a home for life" in a particular purpose-built facility. The authorities
subsequently changed their minds after public consultation and on a rational
basis. The Court of Appeal determined that the promise gave rise to a
substantial obligation to allow one of the plaintiffs, Miss Coughlan, to remain
in the facility. It found that, under the circumstances, it was for the Court to
determine whether there was a sufficient overriding interest to justify departure
from what had previously been promised (i.e. the change of mind had to be
more than merely rational). This was a major departure from the traditional
restraint shown in administrative law cases.
Such restraint is usually
may be more constrained by the related constitutional provisions than the government of a 'stateless' nation."
Id. at 77.
59. Regina v. N. & E. Devon Health Auth., [2001] Q.B. 213 (Ct. App.).

2003]

GLOBALIZATION, REGULATION AND GOVERNMENTS

193

manifested in two ways: by the courts restricting themselves to procedural
remedies rather than substantive ones so as not to fetter lawful executive
actions; and by deference to lawful and rational decisionmaking.
The nature of the public authority responsible for the assurances, while a
major issue in the first part of the judgment, was glossed over in the second.
An official or officials in the Exeter Health Authority (a predecessor to the
respondent health authority) had given the initial assurances to Miss Coughlan,
6
who had, in the meantime, mistakenly been assigned to local authority care. 0
Indeed, Lord Woolf seems to suggest that a crucial factor in the decision to
close the care facility may have been a mistaken view of which body was
legally liable to fund her care. 6' One might have thought that the decision
should have been sent back to the National Health Service to be decided on the
correct understanding of its legal responsibilities.
The matter of the disputed responsibility for her care is not mentioned
again in the second part of the judgment. Instead the Court treats all of these
public authorities as "the Crown" (the most state-like form of "the government
of the day") for the purpose of identifying the authority by whom the assurances
were made.62 Admittedly, the question of how to conceive of the government
or public authority as a juristic person was never in the forefront of the Judges'
minds. The influences are much more subtle and are two-fold. In no fewer
than six places in Lord Woolf's judgment, he suggests, or quotes passages from
other judgments to suggest, that the conduct was equivalent to a breach of
contract.63
Throughout, he emphasizes the similarities between these

60. Id. Part of the dispute involved whether the local authority rather than the NationallHealth Service was
responsible for patients such as Miss Coughlan given changes in eligibility for and categorization of care. The
case decided that the National Health Service remained legally and financially responsible for her care. Id. at
851. It was acknowledged that a misunderstanding of the respective liabilities of the local authority (under its
social service budget) and the NHS may have been partly responsible for the decision to close down the
facility in which she was residing. Id. The Court did not have to consider ifa local authority could have been
held responsible for the undertaking made by an NHS official. Id.
61. See id. 49.
62. See id. 61. In each case it was in relation to a decision by a public authority (the Crown) to rescind a
representation about how it would treat a member of the public. Id.; see also SOREN J. SCHONBERG,
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 163 (2000). Schonberg concludes rather quickly that
the Crown is the equivalent to the state in European law for the purposes of the application of legitimate
expectation doctrine. Id.; cf.John W.F. Allison, Theoreticaland Institutional Underpinningsof a Separate
Administrative Law, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 71-89 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
63. See N. & E. Devon HealthAuth., [2001 ] Q.B. n 54, 59, 69,72,86; cf.id. 80 ("The test in public law
is fairness, not an adaptation of the law of contract or estoppel.") Compare Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Quebec,
106 A.C.W.S.3d 182 (2001) (asserting that the matter must be resolved by contract law principles and
suggesting that the change of policy is irrational and amounts to an abuse of power).
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representations and a contractual "promise or representation." It was made to a
small, identifiable, and closed class of persons; it was relied on; the
consequences of honoring the promises were financial only; and monetary
compensation alone would not suffice as compensation to Miss Coughlan.
These are akin to factors at stake when considering the remedy of specific
performance for breach of contract-a remedy which is not usually available
against the Crown. The contract law analogy served to reorient the judges'
approach from a traditional administrative law one.
The Court did allow that a public authority could withdraw from its
promises without consequences in appropriate circumstances. On this issue, the
judgment illustrates changes in standards of deference, particularly when
international human rights treaties are involved. Where ordinarily the public
authority would be allowed a rational change of mind without substantive
consequences, in this case the Court subjected that change of mind to a test on
the merits. The Court asserted that it could evaluate whether there was a
sufficient overriding interest to justify a departure from the promise. It justified
this lack of deference on the basis that the importance of the promise to Miss
Coughlan was underlined by the Human Rights Act 1998. Article 8(1) of the
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guarantees
the "right to respect for... [her] home."64 The Court clearly indicated that the
more substantial the interference with human rights, the more the court will
require by way of justification. 65 The public authority will be subject to much
stricter scrutiny where international human rights treaties are concerned.66
This decision could be applauded as reaching a humane result at a time
when concerns for "fiscal responsibility" have tended to dominate public
discourse. It could be viewed as part of an emerging "rights-conscious,"
counter-hegemonic trend in administrative law. Yet in many respects, this is a
relatively benign example of the emerging orthodoxy. International treaty
commitments and the "contract-like" commitments of officials reduced judicial
deference to political actors and were binding on successive governments.
Indeed, while many would like to view this case as part of a distinct human
rights jurisprudence, that is not strictly accurate in terms of the provenance of
such developments. Substantive legitimate expectation jurisprudence comes

64. Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, Mar. 9 1953, art. 8(1), Europ. T.S. No. 5,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm.
65. See N. & E. Devon Health Auth., [2001] Q.B. % 63, 93.
66. See id. 63.
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out of E.C. law, 67 and was initially developed in relation to economic and
regulatory cases. 68 It would be more accurate to analyze this case as an
example of human rights advocates (either consciously or unconsciously)
embracing the dominant regulatory instruments and making them work for
social as well as economic purposes. 69 The Coughlan reasoning would equally
apply whenever a commitment is made to a closed class of individuals or
companies, regardless of the political contestability of that policy. 70 Political
questions become legal questions. Public politics is turned into judicial
politics.
I mention this case to suggest possible developments in administrative law
and in the way that it conceives of the state. The threads that can be drawn
between legitimate expectation doctrine and the rise of international and
contract law instruments as a means of regulation may also help to explain why
administrative lawyers have been so divided in their views about the doctrine.
Like contract law, legitimate expectation doctrine, as applied in Coughlan,
reconfigures classical understandings of the functional separation of powers.
The legislature no longer has a monopoly on law-making power, and the
executive is no longer restricted to non-justiciable "policy." Representations
made by the executive can give rise to enforceable legal rights and
responsibilities, the source of that power need not be traced to a delegation
from the legislature. 7'

67. See generally Algera v. Common Assembly, [ 1957] E.C.R. 39. See also SCHONBERG, supra note 62.
He appeals to the same rule of law values of autonomy and certainty that many of the contract law theorists
discuss. (He rejects reliance as an essential factor).
68. The E.C. law is discussed at length in Regina v. Ministry ofAgriculture Fisheriesand Food, [ 199512
All E.R. 714, 726-28.
69. See David Mullan & Antonella Ceddia, The Impact ofPrivatization,Deregulation,Outsourcing,and
Downsizing on Public Law: A Canadian Perspective, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 199 (2002).
70. Hence the discussion by Laws, L.J. in Regina v. Secretary ofStatefor Educ. andEmployment, [2000]
1 W.L.R. 1115, which attempts to add a gloss to this approach. Laws, L. suggests a more traditional view of
deference:
The more the decision challenged lies in what may inelegantly be called the macropolitical field, the less intrusive will be the court's supervision ....
[C]hanges of
policy, fuelled by broad conceptions of the public interest, may more readily be
accepted as taking precedence over the interests of groups which enjoyed expectations
generated by an earlier policy.
Id. at 1131. Laws, L.J. erroneously seems to conclude that promises made to a few identifiable individuals
and macro-political promises are mutually exclusive categories.
71. See Williams, supra note 4, Part I.
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CONCLUSION

The law contains no single concept of the state. The way that different
areas of law conceive of the government as a legal person can be manipulated
to achieve different results. This paper has argued that the dominant regulatory
instruments of this era-the international treaty and the regulatory contractserve to promote a distinct legal conception of the state as a unified juristic
person which is constant over time. Under this conception, the legislature
yields a great deal of power to the executive. The executive, in certain
circumstances, gains the ability effectively to bind both its successors and
successive legislatures. This version of the state differs from the way that
government has traditionally been conceived by domestic public law in the
Anglo-American tradition. Domestic public law has tended to understand
governments in terms of their rival component parts rather than as a unified
whole. Power has traditionally been conceived in temporally contingent ways.
These traditional views are themselves under pressure from international law
and contract law in a way that suggests that the constitutional norms may be
shifting to give more power to the executive in this era.
The effect of these developments is both legal and political. The legal and
political capacities of governments to deliver on electoral mandates and reverse
the undertakings of their predecessors will be more constrained. Given the
global pressures to reduce deficits and to maintain credit ratings, governments,
and especially small governments, will be reluctant to risk damages claims, to
gain a reputation as an unreliable contractor, or to renege on trade agreements.
That may look like governments becoming smaller and weaker, but only
because earlier governments have taken power for themselves to limit their
choices for the future-and especially on the formerly sacred and highly
partisan turf of economic policy.
Much of the legal academic commentary has focused on the importance of
keeping promises, but has ignored the more difficult and more basic question of
who the promise maker is and how it should be conceived. The law respects
and upholds state undertakings in treaties and contracts: governments must
keep their promises. By contrast, the promises made to the electorate are not
promises made by governments or the state, but are merely the undertakings of
political parties with no legal significance.7 2 It is how the government legal
72. In the words of Lord Denning in the FaresFarecase "A manifesto issued bya political party---in order
to get votes-is not to be taken as gospel. It is not to be regarded as a bond, signed, sealed and delivered. It
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actor is conceived that is determinative. The combination of the two prevailing
regulatory instruments in this era of globalization tends to put public politics,
and domestic public promises, at the margins. In order to maintain a public
place for politics-outside of the courts and international forums-we should
start by becoming more self-conscious about who we mean when we refer to

the state.

may contain-and often does contain-promises and proposals that are quite unworkable or impossible of
attainment." Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council, [ 1983] 1AC 768,776; see also
Secretary of State for Educ. and Employment, [2000] 1 WLR 1115. For a political scientist's view of
electoral mandates see R.G. Mulgan, The Changing ElectoralMandate, in M. HOLLAND & J. BOSTON, THE
FOURTH LABOUR GOVERNMENT (1990).

